Category Archives: Turkish Foreign Policy

Eastern Mediteranean: Energy Developments and Geopolitical Implications

Zenonas Tziarras
(PhD (Cand.) Politics & International Studies, University of Warwick, UK)

Since the drillings at block 12 in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for the finding of natural gas were announced a few months ago, a diplomatic crisis, which later became a real threat to the regional stability and security, begun to unfold. Israel and Greece are directly involved in Cyprus’ efforts to drill out its natural gas; the former because of the geographic proximity of its own underwater energy reserves to the Cypriot block, and the latter because of the common Turkish disputes it faces regarding its marine borders, the strong diplomatic and economic bonds it maintains with Cyprus, the economic benefits of exploiting its own underwater energy resources and the need to delimitate its own EEZ.

The circumstances under which these developments have occurred could have probably not been worse given the general instability in the regions due to the Arab Spring, the decline in the Turkish-Israeli relations, the re-ignition of the Kurdish problem, the escalating Syrian crisis and of course the economic crisis. Apart from Cyprus, Greece and Israel, there are other actors involved in this situation and parallel realities that could play a significant role in exacerbating the crisis, leading to unfortunate security consequences.

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Turkey: War or Blank Shots?

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The recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, with Turkey threatening both Israel and Cyprus in an effort to prevent them from proceeding with the extraction of the Cypriot natural gas and beyond, the question that arises is whether Turkey can – or is willing – to carry out its threats.

Given all the things it has accomplished the last decade, including the recent victory of the Islamists against the Kemalist establishment, and knowing that there is indeed a gap of power in the wider Mediterranean region, Turkey, has overestimated itself and has adopted an unprecedentedly arrogant stance which leads to the overt promotion of its national interests. But this arrogance has put it in a very difficult position from which it will hardly come out unscathed. At this moment it is balancing between two realities: the threats that it already made on the one hand and the multiple fronts it has to face on the other. For example Turkey is facing the Kurdish problem at home and on its borders with Northern Iraq, Syria and Iran. Moreover, its relations with Syria are in serious decline because of the crisis that is taking place in the latter. Furthermore, Ankara seems to be losing the support of the Iranian government particularly since it has agreed to install NATO’s anti-missile radar in Turkish soil. To this troubling situation the crisis with Israel has also been added.

Consequently, it would be rational for Turkey not to further escalate the situation. However it has already threatened Cyprus and Israel. It has already used “strategic coercion.” If it does not work, according to this kind of tactic, Turkey should normally proceed in carrying out its threats in order to maintain its credibility as a regional superpower. Anything less than that would affect its image and at the same time it would mean that such a tactic would not be convincing in the future. Therefore Turkey appears to be in a big dilemma: to engage in a war which seems to be beyond its capabilities (mainly because it will weaken its domestic security), or to step back risking the image that it tried so hard to create? The most likely scenario is that Turkey will undertake its well known violations (of airspace and marine boarders), creating small-scale events which it can easily handle, in order to keep the risky equilibrium between what it wants and what it can accomplish. Another – unlikely but nonetheless not implausible – scenario is to see Turkey going beyond what is reasonable and possible, together with a full shift in Davutoglu’s doctrine of “zero-problems” and “soft-power”.

Possible Geopolitical Implications of the Syrian Crisis

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As the crisis in Syria keeps escalating and the violent crackdown of the Bashar al-Assad regime results in more civilian deaths, the growing instability and civil opposition is significantly challenging the die-hard regime and raises questions regarding how much longer it can keep up with the deteriorating domestic situation and the increasing international pressure. More importantly, the troubling question that emerges is what might happen when the regime is finally overthrown?

While people in Syria and the West want a major change to take place in the country, the same cannot be said for some of the other states of the Middle East. Even if western countries want al-Assad to step down they will not intervene in Syria as easily as they did in Libya because this time there is much more at stake since Syria is geographically and geopolitically located at the heart of the Middle East and all of its problems. One needs only to look at a map of Syria and observe the countries with which it shares a border (Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel) to recognize this.

Syria also has political and strategic ties with actors that are hostile to the West such as Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Paradoxically, during the last decade or so Damascus has been maintaining good relationships with Turkey, a mostly western ally, as well. Nonetheless, for the last few months Turkey has been pressuring Assad to stop the violent crackdown and step down. This shift in Ankara’s behavior towards Syria was a concern for other states in the region like Iran – for various reasons which are examined below. From that perspective it seems that if the regime in Syria were to be overthrown and replaced with a pro-western one, the allies of the present Syrian regime could react in unpredictable ways out of fear, possibly disturbing the regional geopolitical realities and even the balance of power.

Iran is already worried because of Turkey’s stance towards the Syrian crisis. During the last decade the good relations between Syria and Turkey, the Kurdish problem that both states face and the “zero problems with neighbors” doctrine of Turkish foreign policy, have brought Iran and Turkey closer to each other. Yet their good relations, in the context of their competition for regional hegemony and their traditional enmity, can still be questioned. For Iran in particular, the commercial and economic bonds that were developed between itself and Turkey were of vital significance since they constituted a way out of the western embargo (which was mainly imposed to counter its nuclear policies) and give impetus to its development aims. Furthermore, Turkey was a key ally for Iran given the always tense situation between Tehran and Tel Aviv and the fact that Turkey’s relations with Israel have been in decline for the last three years. On the other hand, Turkey used its cooperation with Iran to attain more stability in the transnational Kurdish territories, for economic reasons and of course to approach the Arab-Muslim world including the Palestinians. The increasingly strained relations between Turkey and Israel and the development of better relations between Turkey, Syria and Iran have increased Ankara’s prominence among the Arab countries while creating tensions within the western-Israel alliance.

If the Syrian regime were to be replaced with a pro-western one, a number of things could happen. Iran might turn against the new Syrian regime and Turkey for supporting the change while Turkey would probably lose the support of Lebanon, Palestine and probably of other Middle East countries as well. The instability or even sectarian conflicts that could possibly emerge in Syria would create the necessary conditions for the Kurds to intensify their efforts for autonomy thus creating instability and conflicts in Northern Iraq, Turkey and Iran as well. These, in turn, could lead Israel to adopt a harder stance towards Iran and therefore force the US to undertake a more active role in backing it. Within this context Turkey’s developing solidarity with the Arab-Muslim world could fall apart and the doctrine of “zero problems” would face a setback. Hence Ankara would once again have to rely on its traditional western allies, which it has been largely neglecting of late. This, of course, would depend on Turkey’s ability to strike a balance between its old friends and its new potential enemies, especially now that it would have to face the great Iranian threat.

The above scenario may not come to fruition, yet it is far from implausible. Such a scenario would create new regional and international alliances thereby changing the current order and balance of power in the Middle East. The possibility alone of such a development indicates both the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Syria and the reasons why the international community finds it more difficult to intervene there than it did in Libya. Even as the humanitarian crisis that is taking place there worsens, and evidence of genocide emerges, the Syrian crisis is far more complicated than the Libyan one and should consequently be handled with caution by the international community.

Zenonas Tziarras, Global Politics Online Magazine (www.global-politics.co.uk), 4 Sep. 2011.

Turkey’s Civil-Military Crisis

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On July 29th, 2011, the Chief of the General Staff and three other commanding Generals (Navy, Land and Air Forces) resigned. The only General who stayed in his post was the Commander of the Gendarmerie, Necdet Özel. This is a very significant event, not only because this is the first time in Turkish history that a mass resignation of military generals has taken place, but also because it constitutes a very important development in the often troubled sphere of civil-military relations in Turkey.

The reason why the four Generals resigned seem linked both to the Government’s determination not to promote Generals at the Supreme Military Council (YAS) meeting who are suspects in a coup case as well as the indictment of generals and officers with the attempt to overthrow the government though an internet campaign. The latter is a result of the trials that have been going on regarding the persons involved in the military-led Ergenekon conspiracy against the government. The alleged coup attempt was part of the long running dispute between the military institutions and the government due to the intensified efforts of the latter to implement constitutional reforms and thus decrease the power of the military over the state’s administration and political life. Today, although the military’s political power is clearly reduced, the Kemalist elite could not have remained inactive as it was confronted with the negative development of the re-election of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). In this light, the Generals’ action may have been aimed at employing the Kemalist historical heritage and the political culture that still characterises a large portion of the society in order to create the necessary conditions, and provoke the needed popular support, for a military coup or even a massive anti-government protest.

The recently re-elected AKP government had reacted calmly to the situation thus far. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said that this is neither a crisis nor something that cannot be handled, while he initially appointed Necdet Özel, the only General who did not resign, as Land Forces commander and active Chief of General Staff. Thereafter, on August 1, YAS convened to discuss the situation and take decisions, regarding the replacement of the resigned Generals, by the 4th of August. Finally, on August 4, President Abdullah Gül approved YAS’ decisions regarding which Generals should be promoted and who should replace those who resigned. In general, the government’s calm reaction played an important role in maintaining political stability and keeping the tensions to the minimum.

Overall it seems that, while this crisis is of historic significance and could have caused serious problems, the ruling party has handled it well. However, many questions remain unanswered. Was the resignation of the Generals really part of a greater plan? Is this the beginning of yet another coup? How will the AKP utilise the army? Is it possible that we will witness a decline in Turkey’s military power, and therefore in its overall power? As yet, answers remain elusive given the paradoxical nature of Turkish politics.

Despite the low profile reaction of the government it is obvious that the situation is indeed serious. Even so, Erdogan effectively replaced the military elite, thus acquiring more control over the army while maintaining the organisational and administrative stability of the armed forces. To what extent though does this restructuring, of the military institutions, leave the lower levels of the army unaffected and thus create space for anti-governmental tendencies to emerge? It seems that at least for the time being such danger is limited as Erdogan’s political actions have been fairly successful. Furthermore, the nationalist rhetoric, which the military-political elites and their supporters feed off, is not absent from the AKP’s statements or policies. It is important to note that in the days following the Generals resignation, Erdogan adopted a harsher stance regarding the Cyprus problem, clearly aimed at intensifying the nationalistic feelings among the people and thus maintaining social cohesion. That is because the Cyprus problem has always been a very sensitive matter in Turkey that bridges any differences within the society and the elites. From that perspective Erdogan managed to promote himself not only as the Islamist Democrat but also as the leader who does not abandon national problems, like Cyprus, illustrating the extent to which public opinion has acted as an important prong of the Turkish policy-making.

It would appear that the AKP and Erdogan are doing a good job striking a balance between nationalism, democracy and Islam. However, we should not rush to any conclusions since the Turkish political scene is driven by very complicated dynamics which could lead to significantly different developments in the short-term. There is always the possibility that the AKP’s increased power over the military will give the government a more authoritarian character which would mean that the Kemalist authoritarianism will continue to exist albeit in a different form and under different leaders. Lastly, domestic developments in Turkey tend to depend, among other things, on regional developments. Therefore, given the regional fluidity and the security challenges Turkey is facing on its borders, anything is possible.

Zenonas Tziarras, Global Politics, 07/08/2011 at http://www.global-politics.co.uk/.

The Syrian Crisis and Turkey

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After Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, Syria is fast becoming one of the bloodiest domino pieces of the Arab Spring which has shaken the Middle East, North Africa and the Persian Gulf. Yet, the Syrian crisis is a little different in the sense that it could have much greater and more tragic implications for its neighbourhood – namely, in Turkey, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine. However, at the moment, the unrest seems to have had direct effects mainly on Turkey which has found itself in a very difficult situation.

When the riots in Syria first started they were relatively small scale and so today’s mass turnouts could hardly have been predicted. At the outset of the protests (mid-March) the Turkish response was fairly calm, although everyone knew what was at stake if the crisis were to escalate. What Turkey did make clear though was its opposition to any intervention in the area. Specifically, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, said that any international intervention must be avoided because it could bring unwanted results, while Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said that if the international community were confronted with massacres in Syria, then Turkey should undertake a leading role in any response. In the same spirit, Turkey asked for more time to be given to Syria in order for it to implement the reforms promised by President Bashar al-Assad. In the meantime the Turkish government sent humanitarian assistance to its border with Syria to ease any problems caused by the influx of refugees.

Despite the Turkish government’s outward calm, it soon realised the instability that this crisis could bring within its borders, and gradually changed its position. That is, of course, because of the great strategic importance of Syria and its Kurdish population to Turkey in terms of the broader Kurdish problem that Turkey is facing internally and externally. The intensity of the Syrian/Kurdish problem together with the international presence in the region would be a threat to Turkey’s national interests and territorial integrity and so it is understandable that Erdogan’s government would want to take the lead in managing any response.

As it turns out the crisis has not remained limited. Over 1,400 people have been killed and the Syrian refugees that Turkey hosts now number more than 10,000. Furthermore, Bashar al-Assad’s army has been battling protesters and attacking Syrian villages very close to the Turkish border. As the situation with respect to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) worsens and the refugee numbers in Turkey rise, the Turkish government has started to lose its cool. The possibility of a further escalation of the crisis in major civic centres like Damascus, would likely lead to a substantial increase in the flow of refugees. Such a scenario, which could destabilise Turkey internally and give opportunities to the Kurds, is what Ankara fears the most. That is why Turkish authorities are considering the establishment of a safety zone inside Syrian territory to prevent such a development.

The danger though is very real given that the tipping point where a revolt against a regime becomes a civil war seems very close in Syria. That is when the military becomes divided – and marked the decisive point in Egypt’s crisis for Mubarak to step down, as it did in the Libyan civil war we are now witnessing. It has been reported that Syrian military units “clashed with each other” over orders to “crackdown on protesters”. Indeed, this may only be the tip of the iceberg given that we do not know exactly what is happening in Syria, since all foreign media have been prohibited.

It is worth noting that the US and UK share Turkey’s concerns. After all, another war in this geopolitically sensitive region, between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Armenia is the last thing both the West (particularly the US) and Turkey want. It is true, however, that the current situation challenges in the hardest way Turkey’s doctrine of “zero problems with neighbours” and its “soft power” diplomacy. The newly re-elected government under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and PM Tayyip Erdogan are facing a very difficult situation which could determine whether Turkish foreign policy since 2002 when the AKP was first elected has been successful or not. No matter how difficult the task is for the Turkish government, it seems determined to closely monitor the developments not only in Syria but also in the Middle East more generally. Such intentions have been made clear after foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced his Middle East tour, which will also include Syria.

The good relations between Turkey and Syria of late have undoubtedly become strained as a result of the recent crisis. It is clear that no one, neither the West nor Turkey, want a further escalation although the Syrian regime does not seem to be about to give up anytime soon. However, Turkey seems ready to take the appropriate measures in order to maintain the stability in the region and more importantly within its borders. A military confrontation between Turkey and Syria or a rapprochement between Turkey, Israel and the US should not come as a surprise given that Turkey will use all necessary means to achieve its goal of achieving national cohesion and securing its territorial integrity. At this stage of the game for Turkey, the stakes are too high for half measures

Zenonas Tziarras

Posted on Global Politics, July 2, 2011.