Category Archives: Middle East Politics

The Thoughtlessness of the Intervention Advocates – Syria

The horror taking place in Syria is not to be questioned. The way it is utilized by western media, is. The moral need to do something about Syria is not to be questioned. The way morale is utilized for political reasons, is. The fact that Assad must go is not to be questioned. It is the “how” that needs to be discussed and the western-style intervention – which has become a habit – that needs to be questioned. The thoughtlessness of the intervention advocates, with regard to the case of Syria specifically, is unbearable.

Over the last few weeks we’ve been bombarded with “Responsibility to Protect” rhetoric; we’ve been reminded of the (U.S.) need to intervene in Syria to weaken Iran, as well as Hezbollah and Hamas; we’ve been told of all the positive effects a new Syrian regime would have for the region; we’ve been pointed out how useful regional countries (e.g. Turkey) would be in a potential intervention; how Russia would care, but not so much as to cause problems, and so on. It is as if everyone stopped thinking rationally and stopped weighing the costs and benefits. To be honest though, depending on one’s perspective of the situation, the costs and benefits could be entirely different. What would be the objective of an intervention, really? Would it be Iran? Would it be Hamas and Hezbollah? Would it be the Russian interests in the Middle East? Would it be the protection of the Syrian people under the “Responsibility to Protect” umbrella? Or is the “Responsibility to Protect” just the moral cover-up – and the ultimate immoral means – for the achievement of all previous, and more, objectives? I would vote for the latter. In any case, an intervention – if it were to take place – should be about the people. But the fact is that there is no scenario in which the Syrian people – or the region, for that matter – would benefit from an intervention. There are at least five main reasons for that, briefly presented below, which are linked to the simplifications put forward by the intervention advocates.

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The ‘Arab Spring’ and the Kurds of Syria

– The ‘Arab Spring’, has not only influenced Arab peoples but other groups as well. –

The wave of uprisings that has been sweeping the greater region of the Middle East is first and foremost a wave of hope, ambition, and inspiration. This wave has also touched the Kurds. To be sure, the most important issue with regard to the Kurds which has arisen in the midst of the Arab Spring, relates to the case of Syria, and, by extension, to Turkey. What are the ambitions and limitations of the Kurdish minority opposition in Syria?

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Turkey: Zero Chances for "Zero Problems"

Since the election of Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002, Turkey followed a different foreign policy orientation. The man behind this foreign policy shift was Ahmet Davutoglu, today’s Foreign Minister. Davutoglu had a whole new idea about how the goals of Turkish foreign policy should be pursued and in his book “Strategic Depth” (Stratejik Derinlik) (2001) he brilliantly drafts a strategic doctrine for Turkey’s new foreign policy. Despite its relative success, this doctrine is seriously challenged by many regional developments, which are making it hard to believe that its implementation could ever be possible.

“Zero Problems”

A central theme of Davutoglu’s, and Turkey’s, foreign policy doctrine is the “zero problems with neighbors” principle. In brief, this suggests that Turkey wants to re-engage with the Arab world and the broader region more generally, by playing the role of the peace broker and mediator for regional disputes and conflicts. Based on “zero problems” Turkey is willing to abandon its crisis prone attitude and resort to “soft power”, cultural and historical bonds with its neighbors, and create economic and political relations of interdependence between the states of the Middle East and beyond, in order to resolve any bilateral or regional problems. At the same time Turkey is not neglecting the good relations that it should maintain with international actors like the US, EU and Russia. However, the last few months Turkish foreign policy has been facing quite a few problems not only in its region but also internationally. This has led many analysts to reconsider the feasibility of the “zero problems” principles and the goals of the Turkish foreign policy themselves.

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The Sociology of the Arab Spring: A Revolt or a Revolution?

Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings there has emerged a debate on whether this domino of social movements is a revolt or a revolution. With the Tunisian and Egyptian people overthrowing their countries’ dictators, the civil war in Libya turning into a victory for the rebels against the government of Gaddafi, the Syrian crisis intensifying, and the small states of the Gulf being in a state of uncertainty and social instability, the situation is indeed very fluid but the developments of the last few months allow us to evaluate the situation and reach certain conclusions regarding the nature of the recent Middle East crisis.
The sociologist Anthony Giddens created a definition about the term “revolution” based on three elements that occurred from the study of different revolution theories. In short, he suggests that in order for a social movement to be called “revolution’ it needs to be a) a mass social movement, b) a process that will lead to fundamental and systemic changes or reforms, and c) include the use or the threat of use of violence.[1] He also stresses that those who are to rise to power must be more competent than the overthrown establishment and at the same time they must be able to accomplish at least some of their initial goals.
On the other hand revolts are of smaller scale, they last for less time and have more limited outcomes than revolutions. Of course although these elements characterize the nature of the revolutions or of the revolts, they do not identify their causes. There are different theories about what causes revolutions like the ones of Carl Marx and James Davies; nonetheless, we can safely say that, broadly speaking, a revolution is caused by the need of altering a given, often systemic, reality.[2]
A first look at the situation in the Middle East makes the job of deciding whether these social movements are revolutions or revolts very difficult. However, a second look, from the perspective of the aforementioned theoretical framework, clears things out a little. The following table presents the extent to which the most significant Middle East revolt/revolution cases agree with the three elements of the “revolution” definition. “X” indicates which elements can be found in each case.
Mass Social Movements
Fundamental Changes/Reforms
Revolutionary
Violence
Tunisia
X
Egypt
X
X
Libya
X
X
Bahrain
X
Syria
X

It should be noted that the results of the above table are subjective since different people have different views on what constitutes “violence”, “change” or “social movement”.[3] For the purposes of this article a mass social movement is not necessarily class-based or organized but it rather consists of large social masses with at least some common goals regardless of class, age, gender or ethnicity. “Fundamental changes” are important systemic or structural changes that bring about a very different order than before (e.g. perestroika in the late USSR and the end of the Cold War). “Revolutionary violence” refers to brutal violence (not to the stone throwing, for example) that is employed by the rebels as the ultimate means to accomplish the end of the revolution.
As we can see on the table, none of the Middle East social movements qualifies as a revolution although some of them are still in progress. Many would disagree with the argument that in Tunisia and Egypt changes have not taken place. However, although Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mumbarak in Egypt were overthrown, or better, stepped down, the nature of those regimes has not changed: the dictators left but the dictatorships stayed. Therefore, the reforms that the protesters have been asking for are nowhere to be seen. Furthermore it is important that the demands of the protesters were not really politicized; rather, they were focused on overthrowing the dictators and not their policies or regimes. Regarding the use of violence, in Tunisia the protests were massive but not as violent as in Egypt where even the military got divided and Egyptian soldiers fought each other.
In Libya the situation, at first, was very similar to the Egypt case: with massive protests and a divided army. The difference in Libya, though, was that the Libyan leader Gaddafi did not step down; instead he ordered a violent crackdown on the protesters. Consequently the protesters, with the help of the anti-regime military factions, became armed rebels and thus a civil war broke out. In this case there is both a social movement and violence. However the goals of the rebels are limited to the overthrowing of the regime and its leader; no one has specific aims regarding the new political system or the nature of the new regime. In Bahrain there was again massive protesting but the regime’s violent crackdown managed to contain it, and ultimately stop it, while there was not any violence from the part of the protesters. However it should be noted that in Bahrain there is also an ethnic element which inevitably gives a different character to the whole situation. The most recent crisis in Syria presents again mass social movements but the monopoly of violence is still in the hands of the government and the military. The strong ties between the government and the military make the situation even worse for the protesters because they limit the possibility of divisions among the armed forces.
In none of these cases is there an ideological or class orientation. It is just the people against the dictators and their regimes, not the people against the political system or the social structures. Furthermore, most of these revolts went on for a short period of time, apart from Libya and Syria. It is essential to add that in Egypt and Tunisia, for example, even after the end of the crackdown and the step down of the dictators the protests re-emerged, a fact which indicates that things remain mostly the same.
Even though it has been made clear that the Arab spring was not a series of revolutions, but rather a series of revolts, and that it was not a world changing fact, we should still acknowledge their importance. Through these events people realized their power and capabilities and they made a start that could mark the beginning of a new era. The fact that these people obtained some kind of political consciousness is a positive development because it could further evolve and lead to a new “Spring” that would be even more political, more organized, more demanding and more efficient.
Zenonas Tziarras,”The Sociology of the Arab Spring: A Revolt or A Revolution”, The GW Post, 13 Aug. 2011.

[1] Giddens, A., Κοινωνιολογία [Sociology], Gutenberg, 2002, p.655 or the English version, Giddens, A., Sociology, Polity Press, 6th edition, 2009.
[2] In brief, Marx argued that industrial capitalism, which succeeded feudalism, will lead to the clash between the capital owners and the working class since the economic gap between these two classes will increase dramatically and the latter will gradually question the capitalists’ authorities. This, according to Marx, will happen because of the increasing economic inequality between the two classes and the shrinkage of the middle class. On the other hand Davies challenged Marx’s argument by suggesting that ultimate poverty is not by itself the cause of revolutions since there have been periods in history when ultimate poverty existed and yet no revolutions took place. Instead, Davies says, a revolution is more likely to take place when life conditions become better. Better conditions mean greater expectations from the people; therefore when the life conditions stop becoming better and the people’s expectations are not being fulfilled the emerging “relative deprivation” creates revolutionary tendencies.
[3] There are also different ideological perspectives on how a revolution should be undertaken like the anarchic and the organized/Marxist-based ones.

Elections in Turkey

Abstract
The victory of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) was very much expected in the recent Turkish Parliamentary elections that took place on June 12. The AKP managed to get 49.9% of the votes which is not sufficient for an overall majority in the parliament and means that the winners will likely have to seek cooperation with their opponents in order to achieve certain goals. Below we examine the possible outcomes of the AKP’s attempts to create a new constitution as well as assessing the broader outlook for Turkey as it goes forward.
Even without the vast majority that many expected, the AKP’s victory is clear and will help it to start implementing its agenda, albeit with more difficulty than it would like. Of course, this agenda has been much discussed over the last weeks and many of its points are probably known by now. Among other things it includes Turkey’s relations with the EU, the Kurdish question, energy policy and the effort to create a new constitution. The latter point about the new constitution is the culmination of Erdogan’s policy since the AKP’s first election in 2002 which aims to weaken Turkey’s “Deep State” – or in other words the military’s influence in political life – and reduce its influence in the state’s governing apparatus. This will enhance and ease the AKP’s rule by promoting its political objectives, especially its challenging foreign policy agenda.
The efforts to create a new constitution seem like a relatively easy and mostly bureaucratic undertaking since, as has been argued by many, the AKP will likely be able to implement it eventually, either through cooperation in parliament or a referendum. That would, of course, be yet another victory for the AKP after the success of the referendum of September 12, 2010 and the past elections. But this is far from the reality. The political battle[1] that Erdogan and the AKP are about to fight, is perhaps the hardest since the “Ergenekon” case where Kemalists, linked to the army, planned to overthrow Erdogan’s government.
It is important to note that a large part of Turkish society, approximately 30% or more, still supports the Kemalist character of the state and is concerned about the future of the country under the Islamist government of Erdogan. Perhaps the gradual emergence and strengthening of Islam in the country’s political life was inevitable since Kemal’s attempt for modernisation overlooked the extent to which Islam was part of the culture of the people and elites. Nonetheless, Erdogan’s policy today is not all that different. Since 2002, using the guise of Turkey’s candidacy for EU accession and its quest for democratisation, the AKP has implemented various reform packages which aimed, among other things, to undermine the Kemalist influence. We have seen, however, that this process has not left the Kemalist generals unmoved for yet again in the history of the Turkish state, they have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to overthrow the government.
In this light, Erdogan’s attempt to implement a new constitution could be shown to be an even greater danger to the country’s stability. The Kemalists, though weakened, are likely to react unpredictably if a serious attempt to revise the constitution were to take place, since it is this very constitution that made them protectors of the Turkish state and the guardians of the Kemalist principles. In essence, Erdogan is methodically trying to uproot the ideology upon which the creation of the Turkish state rests.
The AKP’s challenges in establishing a new constitution are expected to be stiff. In terms of Turkey’s policy on issues such as the Kurdish Question, the Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus problem, the country’s behaviour is not likely to change. This is mainly because of the geo-economic developments in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as because of Turkey’s questionable ambition to become part of the EU. At its core, the clash between Islam and Kemalism is a conflict over power. However, in national issues (e.g. Armenia, Cyprus, Greece), the interests at stake are the same for both sides.


[1] There has always been a political battle between Kemalism and Islamism (in this case the AKP). Kemalism (named after Kemal, the founder of Turkey) is the ideology upon which the creation of Turkey was based and is mainly driven by secularism and nationalism while opposing the engagement of religion (Islam) in politics. The armed forces are by law the protectors of the Kemalist principles. Islamism – and particularly Turkish political Islam – has its roots in the Ottoman tradition and culture. Since the mid-20th century up until today it has been getting stronger and more involved in the state’s political life, thus causing a clash between the secular Kemalists and neo-Ottoman Islamists.
Zenonas Tziarras
Posted on June 26, 2011, on www.global-politics.co.uk.