It is widely argued that as a result of the 2008-2009 energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine, member-states of the European Union and European countries more generally, want to diversify their energy sources and ultimately reduce their dependency on Russia. In light of this, continental Europe emerges as an energy market in need, while potential alternative energy (natural gas or oil) producers and/or transporters acquire significant geopolitical, geo-economic, and strategic value. The existing energy pipeline projects that end up in Europe, coupled with other similar projects currently in progress and the newly-found natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean – in the Israeli and Cypriot maritime Exclusive Economic Zones – and in the Black Sea, lead to the emergence of a new geo-economic competition of strategic significance. This competition for fulfilling Europe’s energy needs has political extensions and implications for the actors involved. Τhe most important actors taking part in this competition, at this juncture, are arguably Turkey – along with energy producers such as Azerbaijan – and Israel in cooperation with Cyprus and even Greece.
Author Archives: Zenonas Tziarras
Israel, Gaza & the Mideast: An ‘Indirect Approach’?
By Zenonas Tziarras & Panagiotis Andrikopoulos*
Published on EurasiaReview, November 18th, 2012
This article is overreaching and it does so because it accepts one axiom: the only politics that matters is the politics that happens “under the table”. While this does not refer to conspiracy theories it does imply that most people do not know most of the things that shape the socio-political and economic realities of our world. Therefore when a political situation unfolds, depending on the broader context, one has to try to look at the bigger picture; in other words, try to think “outside the box”, if they would like to decode what the reality might be.
Having said that, strategic thinking could help us find unconventional solutions to problems as well as better understand real situations. One of the greatest strategists of the 20th century, Basil Liddell Hart, argued that the more indirect the strategy, the shorter the way to the end, and the more decisive the results. Looking at the unfolding events in Gaza through this prism, even though Israel’s approach may be indirect in tactical terms, as it is based on artillery and airstrikes for now, the ‘indirect’ here does not refer to Israel’s operations in Gaza but to the role these operations play in a possible greater ‘indirect’ strategic plan of the West. This means that, at this juncture, we are looking at the Middle East as a chessboard whereon western and non-western powers clash, and pawns (of different value) such as Israel, Hamas, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Russia, the US and others have a role in the moves that lie ahead. Within this framework there are two questions to be answered: 1) what is the grand strategic aim of the West? Put simply, what is the geopolitical end-game that the West aspires to – in the Middle East? And 2) what micro-strategies/tactics (including ‘indirect approaches’) will be employed in order for this aim to be achieved? Lastly, there is one simple question that triggers and drives the whole discussion: why Gaza, and why now?
A Note on Turkey and the Kurdish Issue: “Hearts & Minds” out the Window
Η Σύγχρονη Τουρκική Στρατηγική Κουλτούρα μέσα από τις Αραβικές Εξεγέρσεις
Ενώ οι θεωρητικές και μεθοδολογικές εξερευνήσεις για την ανάλυση εξωτερικής πολιτικής ποικίλουν και η έννοια της στρατηγικής κουλτούρας μελετάται εδώ και δεκαετίες, η ελληνική βιβλιογραφία παρουσιάζει ένα μεγάλο κενό όχι μόνον όσον αφορά τη συγκεκριμένη έννοια, αλλά και την τουρκική στρατηγική κουλτούρα πιο ειδικά.
Το παρόν άρθρο επιζητεί την σύντομη παρουσίαση της τουρκικής στρατηγικής κουλτούρας – ή κουλτούρας ασφάλειας – μέσα από την ανάλυση των αντιδράσεων της Τουρκίας απέναντι στις εξεγέρσεις του αραβικού κόσμου. Για την επίτευξη αυτού του σκοπού ορίζεται αρχικά η έννοια «στρατηγική κουλτούρα» και στη συνέχεια εξετάζονται στοιχεία και παράγοντες που επηρέασαν και επηρεάζουν την τουρκική εξωτερική πολιτική, περιφερειακή πολιτική και στρατηγική συμπεριφορά. Το θεωρητικό και ιστορικό πλαίσιο της τουρκικής στρατηγικής κουλτούρας θα εφαρμοστεί στην περίπτωση της πολιτικής της Τουρκίας απέναντι στις αραβικές εξεγέρσεις σε μια προσπάθεια επεξήγησης των κινήσεων της Άγκυρας και των παραγόντων που επηρεάζουν τις στρατηγικές της επιλογές
Για ολόκληρο το άρθρο πατήστε εδώ.
Δημοσιεύτηκε στο Journal on Southeastern European Security Strategy and Transatlantic Leadership, Vol. IV,, Oct. 2012.
The Law of the Sea Convention, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Clinton’s Testimony
Abstract:
Since the U.S. is still the world’s sole superpower, its participation in international conventions is very important for both itself and the better function and implementation of the various International Legal Frameworks. As such, a possible future ratification of the [Law of the Sea] Convention by the U.S. would have broad politico-legal implications for other states and areas in the world, where the Treaty has not been signed or ratified and maritime disputes are in place. One such region is the Eastern Mediterranean. This paper firstly looks at the development of the Law of the Sea, the contested provisions of UNCLOS III in the Eastern Mediterranean disputes, and then focuses specifically on Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Israel, with regard not only to traditional maritime territorial disputes but also recent developments in the bilateral relations of these countries and in the region, more generally. The analysis concludes with the obstacles that the American politics pose to the ratification of UNICLOS III by the US.
To read the paper click here.
SI Research Paper 2/2012, Strategy International, October 2012.