Author Archives: Zenonas Tziarras

Turkey’s Civil-Military Crisis

On July 29th, 2011, the Chief of the General Staff and three other commanding Generals (Navy, Land and Air Forces) resigned. The only General who stayed in his post was the Commander of the Gendarmerie, Necdet Özel. This is a very significant event, not only because this is the first time in Turkish history that a mass resignation of military generals has taken place, but also because it constitutes a very important development in the often troubled sphere of civil-military relations in Turkey.
The reason why the four Generals resigned seem linked both to the Government’s determination not to promote Generals at the Supreme Military Council (YAS) meeting who are suspects in a coup case as well as the indictment of generals and officers with the attempt to overthrow the government though an internet campaign. The latter is a result of the trials that have been going on regarding the persons involved in the military-led Ergenekon conspiracy against the government. The alleged coup attempt was part of the long running dispute between the military institutions and the government due to the intensified efforts of the latter to implement constitutional reforms and thus decrease the power of the military over the state’s administration and political life. Today, although the military’s political power is clearly reduced, the Kemalist elite could not have remained inactive as it was confronted with the negative development of the re-election of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). In this light, the Generals’ action may have been aimed at employing the Kemalist historical heritage and the political culture that still characterises a large portion of the society in order to create the necessary conditions, and provoke the needed popular support, for a military coup or even a massive anti-government protest.
The recently re-elected AKP government had reacted calmly to the situation thus far. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said that this is neither a crisis nor something that cannot be handled, while he initially appointed Necdet Özel, the only General who did not resign, as Land Forces commander and active Chief of General Staff. Thereafter, on August 1, YAS convened to discuss the situation and take decisions, regarding the replacement of the resigned Generals, by the 4th of August. Finally, on August 4, President Abdullah Gül approved YAS’ decisions regarding which Generals should be promoted and who should replace those who resigned. In general, the government’s calm reaction played an important role in maintaining political stability and keeping the tensions to the minimum.
Overall it seems that, while this crisis is of historic significance and could have caused serious problems, the ruling party has handled it well. However, many questions remain unanswered. Was the resignation of the Generals really part of a greater plan? Is this the beginning of yet another coup? How will the AKP utilise the army? Is it possible that we will witness a decline in Turkey’s military power, and therefore in its overall power? As yet, answers remain elusive given the paradoxical nature of Turkish politics.
Despite the low profile reaction of the government it is obvious that the situation is indeed serious. Even so, Erdogan effectively replaced the military elite, thus acquiring more control over the army while maintaining the organisational and administrative stability of the armed forces. To what extent though does this restructuring, of the military institutions, leave the lower levels of the army unaffected and thus create space for anti-governmental tendencies to emerge? It seems that at least for the time being such danger is limited as Erdogan’s political actions have been fairly successful. Furthermore, the nationalist rhetoric, which the military-political elites and their supporters feed off, is not absent from the AKP’s statements or policies. It is important to note that in the days following the Generals resignation, Erdogan adopted a harsher stance regarding the Cyprus problem, clearly aimed at intensifying the nationalistic feelings among the people and thus maintaining social cohesion. That is because the Cyprus problem has always been a very sensitive matter in Turkey that bridges any differences within the society and the elites. From that perspective Erdogan managed to promote himself not only as the Islamist Democrat but also as the leader who does not abandon national problems, like Cyprus, illustrating the extent to which public opinion has acted as an important prong of the Turkish policy-making.
It would appear that the AKP and Erdogan are doing a good job striking a balance between nationalism, democracy and Islam. However, we should not rush to any conclusions since the Turkish political scene is driven by very complicated dynamics which could lead to significantly different developments in the short-term. There is always the possibility that the AKP’s increased power over the military will give the government a more authoritarian character which would mean that the Kemalist authoritarianism will continue to exist albeit in a different form and under different leaders. Lastly, domestic developments in Turkey tend to depend, among other things, on regional developments. Therefore, given the regional fluidity and the security challenges Turkey is facing on its borders, anything is possible.
Zenonas Tziarras, Global Politics, 07/08/2011 at  http://www.global-politics.co.uk/.

Themes of Global Security: From the Traditional to the Contemporary Security Agenda

Introduction
Security and globalisation are two key concepts that we need to take into account in order to understand today’s international relations. In this light a significant number of both simple and complicated questions, that should be answered in order to understand global security today, arises. Some of these questions are: what does security mean? What is globalisation? Do we really live in a post-Westphalian system? What is armed conflict and what causes it? Is the proliferation of nuclear weapons really bad? Is the nuclear capability really enough to deter and maintain peace? Should the security concept be broadened? If yes, what other threats should it include? How “new” are “new wars” and to what extent is the “state failure” thesis valid? Is the “global war on terror” justified or is terrorism a means to a just end? Is it possible for development and security to coexist or should one of them pre-exist? How serious threat to security is the environment today and why? Should we see refugees as a humanitarian problem or as a security threat? In what follows we shall try to briefly address the above topics thus providing an overview of the contemporary global security environment.
The Concept of Security and the Globalised International System
To begin with it should be noted that the concept of “security” is, indeed, a subjective one. Despite traditional ideas such as world peace and national security or non-traditional threats such as poverty, the environment and the well being of the individual, it is true that “security” should be generally understood as a status of satisfying stability; in other words, the safety of what different referent objects consider valuable by dealing with different threats through different security policies.[i] From that perspective, it becomes clear that the concept of “security” should be broadened and that is, to a great extent, because of the impact that globalisation has had on international relations and international security. That is not to say that globalisation is a recent process. History suggests that globalisation processes have been going on for years, even centuries. Going back to the definition of globalisation, it seems that the main difference between the present day and a century ago, is the evolution of information technology and communications as well as the increased interconnectedness between states due to (apart from the information technology) the spread of liberal trade and market economy. Having said that, we have to admit that the globalisation dynamics, along with the impact of the end of the Cold War, have changed the security priorities. Thus, in the same way that interconnectedness can maintain the peace, according to the liberal ideas,[ii] it can also affect the international security because, today, what happens in one part of the world can affect another.
Even though the globalisation thesis maintains that we live in a post-Westphalian, less state-centric, global system, that does not mean that the nation-state has lost its role. The 1648 Westphalia agreement officialised the state as we still know it today, and acknowledged certain characteristics of it such as the centralised/nationalised political authority and the homogeneity of state population. As such, state was – and still is – perceived as the main actor in the international system. On the other hand, the post-Westphalian system thesis suggests that the state-centric system is fading and that new, non-state actors are emerging to take their place in the realm of international relations/security. It also suggests that extra-systemic or extra-state conflicts – that is, conflicts between state and non-state actors – have taken the place of wars between states, proxy wars, and even anti-colonialism (liberation) wars. In order to better understand the non-traditional security thinking and the post-Westphalian model we should first examine the state-centric international order and the traditional/strategic security understanding.
Cold War and Traditional Security
A very good way to understand the traditional security is through the study of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons reflect the reality of the Cold War and therefore the predominance of political Realism and strategy during that time.[iii] Nuclear weapons are considered to be the most extreme form of military power. They could provide crisis stability, prevention of conventional war, and general foreign policy support. The possession of nuclear weapons is based on the idea that security is achieved by creating insecurity. From that perspective nuclear weapons do not create deterrence; instead, deterrence creates nuclear weapons. Within this context we can understand France’s effort to stay on top of things after decolonisation and Pakistan’s effort to even up with India’s power and Russia’s efforts to compete with the U.S.
One could argue that even though nuclear weapons are, morally speaking, fundamentally evil, they can contribute in maintaining the stability between two states. However, it is also true that nuclear weapons are not enough to maintain peace because of the emergence of non-state actors that could drive a state to make the first strike. For example in India and Pakistan – despite the fact that the two countries try to avoid the breakout of a nuclear war – violent actions from non-state/terrorist actors (with bases either in India, Pakistan or Kashmir) could trigger a conflict. That is because one of these parties could blame the other for being the driving force behind, or the haven for, these actions.
The Emergence of the Contemporary Security Agenda
During the 80s, this narrow perception of security started fading out. Realist notions such as the state-centric international system, the pessimistic view of the world, and the anarchy of the international system were challenged by the, more optimistic, neo-liberal approach as well as by other critical approaches to security like constructivism, feminism, green theory and post-modernism. In addition, the securitisation concept became a particularly interesting one since it claims that certain issues are transformed into security issues by certain actors; in other words, our perception of certain actors or realities as security threats, is socially and politically constructed.
The social construction discourse is also directly associated with identity politics. Identity politics can be found mainly in the scholarship which deals with civil wars and ethnic conflicts. Indicatively we note that civil wars are generally included in the framework of intrastate wars, which means that they are limited within certain territorial boundaries, while the concept of ethnic conflict is mainly characterised by ethnic identity.
The Contested “New” Security Threats and Terrorism
Having seen the transition from traditional to contemporary security it should be noted that some aspects of the broader concept of security, like the “new wars” and “state failure” thesis” are a little exaggerated.[iv] Even though globalisation and the evolution of technology have played a role in affecting the character of recent wars, most of the “new wars” arguments lack historical perspective. For example, the atrocities and the victimisation of civilians, that the “New wars” thesis presents as “new” characteristics of armed conflicts, have always existed and have remained mostly unchanged.
Likewise, the “fail state” thesis seems to be, indeed, a securitised matter.[v] Even though “failed states” present certain characteristics that could affect negatively their socio-political system and consequently the regional or international security, it is obvious that only certain states are chosen to be identified as “failed” over other states with similar socio-political status. This is part of a western political construction which seeks to associate certain states with the threat for regional or global security according to the western interests.[vi] Consequently we can conclude that the “failed states” or “state failure” concept is, at least, contested and subjective. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that “failed states” could be ideal havens for terrorist groups or they could constitute possible bases for transnational terrorism activities. That is of course important since terrorism, after September 11, is perceived as one of the most prominent global security threats.
Despite the American rhetoric, that has been developed after 2001, regarding terrorism and the religious/Islamic fundamentalism, it is a fact that the casualties caused by state terrorism are far greater than non-state terrorism’s. It is also important that before the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 there was not a single suicide bombing in that country. Having said that there has to be made a distinction between the two main categories of terrorism. First, the terrorism of non-state actors (of the weak); second, the terrorism of state actors (of the strong). The difference between the two is that states can get away with it. This is not to suggest that non-state actors’ terrorism is justified but to say that it is a matter of perception. Furthermore terrorism, especially the non-state one, is a product of a reaction rather than an action, which leads to a vicious circle. As far as the US’s “global war on terror” is concerned, it has been proved mostly unsuccessful. That is for two main reasons: first, terrorism is a tactic and one cannot go to war against a tactic and, second, a just war cannot be fought by unjust means because it prolongs the vicious circle. The latter could apply for both state- (e.g. US) and non-state (e.g. Al-Qaida) actors.
Development, Peace-building and Security
In order to deal with most of the aforementioned security problems, the international community has been undertaking peacekeeping, peace-building, state-building and economic development operations in several parts of the world, with the hope that domestic stability and reconciliation between the conflicting parties (either identity groups or states) will result in local and regional security. These operations are mainly based on the neoliberal ideas and their aim is the structural adjustment of the states in need by alleviating problems such as poverty, human rights violations, the lack of juridical system and by establishing a better welfare system in order to minimise the feelings of insecurity.
Two problems can be identified in this logic: first, development and security are linked through policies that constitute a new form of imperialism and, second, the dilemma regarding which process (development or security) should come first in order for the second one to work better. In terms of the neo-imperialism argument, although most state-building operations have imperialistic intensions, no one can disagree with the fact that these operations make those states more viable to live in. However, the bottom-up change should be also considered. From that perspective reconciliation and security should come first along with some basic development activities in order for the state-building to succeed.[vii]
Contemporary “Human Security” Threats
Although the aspects of global security that we have examined so far are very important, the contemporary security agenda expands further that terrorism, “failed states” and “new wars”. Especially after the end of the Cold War, the environment, migration and forced migration have gradually become very important. The environmental change, as a security threat, could cause several direct and indirect problems such as: heightened sea levels, food and water shortage, increased pollution and diseases, natural disasters, international or intrastate conflicts, migration, etc.[viii] Furthermore, having accepted that the environmental change is a valid and very important security threat (a mainly “human security” threat), migration and forced migration are the next very important issues on the security threat agenda. Migration is a problem that could be the result of the environmental change, or inter and intrastate conflicts, while it could also be a strategy that employs intentional forced displacement as a means in order to cause instability in a nearby country (e.g. Pakistan-India). From that perspective the problem of migration could not only be a humanitarian problem but also a security problem. In this case, the dilemma is to whether to deal with refugees as a humanitarian problem when at the same time that could mean fostering and providing havens to “refugee warriors”.[ix]  Potential security threats that can occur from forced migration or militarised refugees are: triggering a seemingly local but essentially trans-boundary conflict in the host state; the polarisation of the host society; a conflict between refugees and the host government; tensions between the host and the home governments, etc. It is clearly a complicated subject but the fact that we cannot just stop helping refugees because that could help militarised groups, is generally accepted. What we could do is focus on how to prevent refugee displacement by resolving the conflict before it breaks out or try to contain it in close cooperation with the local and regional actors.
Conclusions and Security Management
International security has, indeed, come a long way since the end of the Cold War. New security threats emerge every day while this analysis has only presented a small part of the complex and multileveled nature of the contemporary global security agenda. Thus international security cannot be studied without taking into account the new and emerging challenges or even exaggerated concepts such as “new wars” or “failed states”. However, a historical perspective is needed in order to validate or criticise such concepts. Furthermore a comparative analysis of the past and present nature of the international system is always important to clearly identify any structural or other differences. Lastly, in order to effectively address a security threat the selection of a security policy or agent must be based on which value, of which referent object, is threatened and on what threatens it.

[i] Baldwin elaborates this way of conceptualizing security in Baldwin, A. David, “The Concept of Security”, Review of International Studies, Volume 23, 1997, pp.23-56. 
[ii] This draws mainly upon Kant’s notion that liberal democracies/states are more peaceful. In this context liberal policies, economy and institutions create a “liberal” network of common/interconnected interests thus maintaining peace. See for example Kant Immanuel, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, 1795 at http://www.constitution.org/kant/perpeace.htm and Levy S. Jackob, “War and Peace” in Carlsnaes W., Risse T. & Simmons A. B., eds., Handbook of International Relations, SAGE, London, 2002, pp.356-357.
[iii] See for example Waltz Kenneth, “The spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better”, Adelphi Papers, Number 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.
[iv] See for example Kaldor Mary, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in A Global Era, Polity, Cambridge, 2007.
[v] See Newman Edward, “Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World”, Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 30, No.3, 2009,  pp.421-443.
[vi] Ibid, pp.437.
[vii] See, Stewart Frances, “Development and Security”, Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 4, No.3, 2004 pp.261-287.
[viii] See, Barnett Jon, “Security and Climate Change”, Global Environmental Change, Volume 13, 2003, pp.7-17.
[ix] See, Adelman Howard, “Why Refugee Warriors are Threats”, The Journal of Conflict Studies, Volume 18, No.1. 1998 and Barber Ben, “Feeding Refugees, or War? The dilemma of Humanitarian Aid”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1997.
Zenonas Tziarras
Published on the Online Magazine “The GW Post“, on August 4, 2011.

Τουρκία – Καλημέρα και Έφεξε!

Έχουν προκαλέσει οι δηλώσεις του Τούρκου πρωθυπουργού Ταγίπ Ερντογάν αλλά παράλληλα φαίνεται να έχουν ενώσει τις πολιτικές δυνάμεις τις Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας (ΚΔ). Είπε πολλά ο κ. Ερντογάν. Μεταξύ άλλων δήλωσε ότι εάν το Κυπριακό δεν λυθεί μέχρι τη στιγμή που η ΚΔ αναλάβει την προεδρία της ΕΕ τότε οι σχέσεις της Τουρκίας με την ΕΕ θα παγώσουν. Το Εθνικό Συμβούλιο πάντως συμφώνησε: αλλαγή στρατηγικής. «Αλλαγή στρατηγικής», «αλλαγή στρατηγικής», «αλλαγή στρατηγικής». Το ακούμε κάθε μέρα από τηλεοράσεως και το διαβάζουμε κάθε μέρα σε άρθρα βουλευτών και άλλων πολιτικών προσώπων αλλά κανείς δεν ξέρει τι σημαίνει, άσε που δεν το βλέπουμε. Ποια είναι αυτή η αλλαγή στρατηγικής αν επιτρέπεται;
Μήπως αλλαγή στρατηγικής είναι, όπως πρότεινε το ΔΗΚΟ, η αποσύνδεση των συνομιλιών κατά την Κυπριακή Προεδρία της ΕΕ ή το να αποσύρουμε τις προτάσεις μας στον τομέα της διακυβέρνησης, όπως πρότειναν οι ΟΙΚΟΛΟΓΟΙ; Ή μήπως αλλαγή στρατηγικής σημαίνει να σταματήσουμε να συζητάμε και στη βάση διζωνικής δικοινοτικής ομοσπονδίας επιδιώκοντας είτε «ευρωπαϊκές» είτε άλλες λύσεις; Βέβαια το ποίο είναι το περιεχόμενο αυτών των άλλων λύσεων δεν έχει και πολύ σημασία αφού είναι ούτως η άλλως πολιτικά άκαιρες – για να μην πω και άκυρες.
Ένα σας λέω: αγρόν ηγόρασε η Άγκυρα. Ποσώς την ενδιαφέρει για τέτοιου είδους αλλαγές στρατηγικής, άσε που μπορεί να την χαροποιούσε που θα βρισκόταν απέναντι σε μια πολιτική που είναι «φύλλο στον άνεμο». Κατ’ αρχήν η απόσυρση οποιωνδήποτε προτάσεων από το τραπέζι των διαπραγματεύσεων πλήττει την πολιτική μας ακεραιότητα και μειώνει την αξιοπιστία μας. Τέλος, αφήνοντας πίσω τα περί αλλαγής της βάσεως λύσης, ότι και αν επιχειρήσει η ΚΔ από την προεδρία της ΕΕ δεν πρόκειται να συγκινήσει την Άγκυρα. Πρέπει πλέον να χωνέψουμε ότι η Τουρκία αντιλήφθηκε πως οι πιθανότητες που έχει για ένταξη στην ΕΕ είναι πολύ λίγες όχι μόνο λόγω των διαφωνιών που έχουν κάποια Ευρωπαϊκά κράτη αλλά και διότι, εκ των πραγμάτων, η παρούσα οικονομική κατάσταση της ΕΕ δεν επιτρέπει μια διεύρυνση του μεγέθους της Τουρκίας. Επιπλέον η διατήρηση της κατοχής στην Κύπρο έχει σαφώς περισσότερα οφέλη για την Τουρκία από αυτά που μπορεί να της προσφέρει το όποιο, πιθανότατα προσωρινό, άνοιγμα κεφαλαίων για ένταξη. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα η Τουρκία δεν καίγεται για το τι θα προκύψει στις σχέσεις της με την ΕΕ. Ούτως η άλλως αυτό που πάντα ενδιέφερε την Άγκυρα, κατά κύριο λόγο, ήταν η εκμετάλλευση των οικονομικών στηριγμάτων που λαμβάνει από την Ένωση. Παρόλα αυτά εμείς παραμένουμε με την εντύπωση ότι μπορούμε να πιέσουμε την Τουρκία χρησιμοποιώντας τις «προσπάθειές» της για ένταξη στην ΕΕ. Είναι ακριβώς αυτή η παρωχημένη λογική που πρέπει να αλλάξει. Πρέπει να καταλάβουμε πλέον ότι το διπλωματικό παιχνίδι στη βάση της ΕΕ είναι άγονο και ότι τα όνειρα που κάναμε, με αφορμή την ευρωπαϊκή μας ένταξη το 2004, ήταν όνειρα θερινής νυκτός.
Και ενώ τα παραπάνω είναι – ή θα έπρεπε να είναι – εξόφθαλμα, οι πολιτικοί μας ανακάλυψαν ότι η Τουρκία, με τις δηλώσεις Ερντογάν, έδειξε τον πραγματικό της εαυτό και τις πραγματικές της προθέσεις. Καλημέρα και έφεξε! Κοιμόμαστε τον ύπνο του δικαίου. Θέλαμε και «Ερντογάν» να μας πει αυτό που είναι φανερό εδώ και δεκαετίες; Τόσα χρόνια πολιτικής πάλης τώρα αντιληφθήκαμε τι γίνεται;
Τελικά, η επιλογή για αλλαγή στρατηγικής είναι μια: να σταματήσουμε να δίνουμε υπέρμετρη αξία στην ευρωπαϊκή μας δυναμική και στις σχέσεις μας με την Ελλάδα και να έχουμε ακέραια και σταθερή πολιτική στις διακοινοτικές διαπραγματεύσεις. Παράλληλα είναι ζωτικής σημασίας η επέκταση των διπλωματικών μας σχέσεων με κράτη της ευρύτερης Μέσης Ανατολής (όπως το Ισραήλ και η Αίγυπτος) και τη Ρωσία εντείνοντας έτσι τους οικονομικούς, πολιτικούς και ενεργειακούς μας δεσμούς με αυτές τις χώρες. Μόνο έτσι μπορούμε να δημιουργήσουμε μοχλούς πίεσης προς την Τουρκία, στηριζόμενοι κυρίως στην ενεργειακή πολιτική. Ας ξυπνήσουμε.
Ζήνωνας Τζιάρρας, Εφημερίδα “Γνώμη”, 29/07/2011, σ.10

Strategy: An Art or a Science?

There are different levels of strategy. If we were to give a very broad definition though on what is strategy, we would say that strategy is the use of means for the achievement of ends. If we are talking about military strategy then we are talking about the use of military means for the accomplishment of the end of war. If we are talking about a state’s or coalition of states’ grand strategy, then, as Liddell Hart put it, we are talking about the use of all available means – including the military – to accomplish an end.
Given all the above, generally speaking, the way each strategist uses the available means in given situations differs and is not determined by certain laws. To paraphrase Clausewitz, the way a strategy is created and the way means are used, depends on the “genius” and “ability” of the leadership or the commander. Therefore, strategy cannot be explained as positive science, but rather as an art, since it has to be flexible and adaptable based on the creativity (art) of the strategist.
Nonetheless there have been people who disagreed with this notion like Bernard Brodie and Jomini who argued that a more scientific/systematic methodological approach has to be adopted for the better understanding of strategy and also the creation of certain strategy rules that could solve – according to Brodie – practical problems. However, both the above persons revised their views to a certain extent: Brodie was surprised by the lack of ‘political sense’ in the scientific strategic analyses and Jomini, even though he never clearly acknowledged it, he later tented to agree with Clausewitz’s explanation.
After all, strategy is created to manage certain political or military situations and ultimately war. Based on the fact that war – as every other political situation – is a social activity, and given that social activities are unbelievably complicated due to the different types of people involved in them, then the formation of a strategy cannot be simple or easy. Furthermore, because of this complexity, we have to admit that the axiom suggesting that strategy is more of an art than a science is oversimplified. Theoretical or even philosophical concepts contain much more than a mere definition no matter how wide or complicate it is. Thus, especially considering the different levels of strategy (e.g. operational level, national level, and grand strategic level), strategy contains both scientific and artistic/creative parameters. If we are talking for example about the operational level then scientific methods and innovation could play an important role in the formation of strategy.
Limiting the concept of strategy in one word like “art” or “science”, or even in both, is methodologically wrong; maybe that is why experts like Jomini and Brodie reconsidered their ideas and also why Clausewitz concluded that art and science cannot be clearly distinguished. I would argue that they rather co-exist in different analogies and degrees according to the given situation.
Conclusively, as mentioned earlier, if we were to strictly characterise strategy as an “art” or a “science”, it would have to be “art”. That is not only because of what has been already mentioned, but also because of the ability and creativity that is needed to face the constant change of data in such situations due to the “friction”, or just due to the fact that social activities are too complex. Science, although creative in many cases, at times of fluidity, rapid developments and emotional upheaval is inflexible.

Cyprus – After the Tragedy of April 11, 2011

Early in the morning of July 11, 2011 at the naval base “Evangelos Florakis” in Limassol, Cyprus, 98 containers filled with gunpowder and TNT explosives detonated leaving 13 people dead and 61 others wounded. The explosion generated a blast wave with a radius of 5-6km, causing incalculable damage to the Naval Base, to the electricity generating station of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC), and to properties in nearby villages. The tragic irony is that these munitions did not even belong to Cyprus. In 2009 it had seized them within its territorial waters from a Russian ship, en route from Iran and bound for Syria. Over the last three years the containers had been the subject of discussions within the Ministry of Defence and the High Command of the National Guard (GEEF) without any substantial progress as to what to do with them. Also, despite the constant reminders and warnings from the naval base commander, the necessary security measures had not been taken although the risks were very obvious.
This tragic incident in conjunction with other local, regional and international circumstances is likely to create unbearable consequences in many sectors, especially the economy. Furthermore, it raises questions about the role and status of the National Guard (NG) and the country’s future outlook.
The whole world, and especially Europe, is going through a financial crisis which has led to the weakening of national economies and the European Union itself through the crisis within the Euro-zone. Important examples of this European economic downturn are Greece and Spain while in recent months Cyprus has joined the list of affected countries as well. In this context, the circumstances under which the July tragedy took place could not have been worse. The total damage to the Cyprus economy is estimated at more than 3 billion Euros.
In this light it is certain that the Republic of Cyprus will be burdened with huge costs in order to restore the power station, which meets 50-60% of the Island’s energy needs. Apart from that, there are direct economic effects. The lack of electricity has already caused huge economic losses in small and large businesses which drive the Cyrpiot economy. In addition, the hotel industry and tourism related businesses have been seriously affected since the incident, causing holidaymakers to stay away from Cyprus. This has exacerbated the already weak financial picture while also potentially leading to higher unemployment rates as businesses are forced to close. Apart from the impact on Cyprus, this situation also has the potential to affect the EU as a whole, due to the generally fragile economic situation across Europe.
Indeed, the energy crisis on Cyprus caused by the destruction of the electricity station highlights the need for more renewable energy resources and a more efficient exploitation of the country’s undersea energy resources.
The economic weakening of a state implies the reduction of its total power. This does not necessarily mean that the state becomes paralysed but due to it being in a disadvantageous position, it cannot always follow the domestic or foreign policy course that it wants. Often this results in a government losing its popular support and, inevitably, a conflict between state and society. In Cyprus, this scenario is even more complicated because of the political-military problem which the Republic of Cyprus faces with the Turkish occupation.
Turkey has always followed a wait and see policy to exploit any political developments which occur on Cyprus, so that it can gain as much advantage as possible. When a state loses part of its diplomatic power – which cannot remain unaffected given its linkages with all the other sources of state power – then its effectiveness in any kind of negotiation is brought into question. Additionally, if the Republic of Cyprus suffers a significant weakening of its economy, then it will find itself in a disadvantageous position in terms of its agreements with other countries and with multinational corporations regarding the management of its energy resources. Such a situation often leads to a vicious cycle where economic failure and social instability weaken the country’s ability to negotiate on the international stage.
Of course, all of these levels of governance and policy-making are controlled by people who have either personal or collective responsibility, as members of political parties. In Cyprus, the nepotism and self-interest that characterises the state’s administrative machine are chiefly to blame for the political failures and the poor management of the economy which are part and parcel of the current crisis.
The tragedy of July 11th is not the first in the NG’s history and has highlighted systemic problems within both the NG and the Ministry of Defence. Other accidents have preceded this one including errors in the handling of ammunition and weapons, resulting in many deaths and injuries over the years. Some have argued that the NG should receive more state funding to alleviate these weaknesses, particularly given that Cyprus is an occupied state which has to have the means to defend itself in case hostilities with Turkey ever re-ignite. However, the political and military realities are very different from 30 or 40 years ago. Based on any rational analysis, the situation facing Cyprus is made all the more tragic when it becomes clear that demilitarization would be a much better option for the Republic, not only on the political and economic levels but on the strategic level as well. The maintenance of the NG, which has no pragmatic or positive benefits for the state and burdens the economy as well, is clearly a continued handicap for Cyprus compared with the benefits which demilitarization could provide.
There is a truth that needs to be sought in the wake of this tragedy, a problem which the resignation of the Minister of Defence and the Head of GEEF has still not resolved. The realities and possibilities discussed above must be weighed and decisive steps must be taken if Cyprus is to emerge from the current crisis, while the role of the National Guard should be re-examined. In such moments, superficial policies or doctrinal notions are neither suitable nor acceptable. The Republic’s governing authorities as well as every politician should work for the common good. This is their opportunity to demonstrate that political integrity still exists and alter the dubious political image they have been presenting for so many years.
Zenonas Tziarras
Published on July 23, 2011 on www.global-politics.co.uk
A Greek version of this article can be found here